University of Nebraska - Lincoln

DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln
Faculty Publications from the Department of
Electrical and Computer Engineering

Electrical & Computer Engineering, Department
of

3-28-2017

IP Flow Mobility in the Industry: From An Economic Perspective
Jun Huang
Fang Fang
Cong-Cong Xing
Yi Qian

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/electricalengineeringfacpub
Part of the Computer Engineering Commons, and the Electrical and Computer Engineering Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Electrical & Computer Engineering, Department of at
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications from
the Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering by an authorized administrator of
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln.

Open Access CC-BY

Received January 31, 2017, accepted February 14, 2017, date of publication February 17, 2017, date of current version March 28, 2017.
Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/ACCESS.2017.2671446

IP Flow Mobility in the Industry: From An
Economic Perspective
JUN HUANG1 , (Senior Member, IEEE), FANG FANG1 , CONG-CONG XING2 ,
AND YI QIAN3 , (Senior Member, IEEE)
1 School

of Communication and Information Engineering, Chongqing University of Posts and Telecommunications, Chongqing 400065, China
of Mathematics and Computer Science, Nicholls State University, Thibodaux, LA 70310, USA
of Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of Nebraska–Lincoln, Lincoln, NE 68588 USA

2 Department
3 Department

Corresponding author: J. Huang (xiaoniuadmin@gmail.com)
This work was supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant 61309031.

ABSTRACT The popularity of social media together with the advancement of mobile Internet applications
enabling the uploading of data plays a dominant role in the entire Internet traffic. IP flow mobility (IFOM) is
proposed as an effective means to enhance the system capacity by offloading data from the cellular network
to WiFi or Femtocells or other complementary networks. Although IFOM has been extensively investigated
during the past few years, most of these studies, however, are concerned with IFOM technical issues
only; little work regarding the IFOM application has been done from the service providers’ perspective.
Unlike previous research, in this paper, we address the economic issue involved with the IFOM technology.
Specifically, competition among multiple service providers supporting or not supporting IFOM are explored,
and a game model for the competition is developed. The Nash equilibrium for the game model is then
analyzed. Based on the analysis, an algorithm for Nash equilibrium computation is proposed. Also, numerical
experiments are conducted to determine the factors that affect the market share and profit of the service
providers. We believe that this research paper will shed light on service providers for the promotion and
application of IFOM technology.
INDEX TERMS IP flow mobility (IFOM), service provider, network economics, game theory.

I. INTRODUCTION

The rapid development of smart devices is reshaping the
way of people using the Internet ranging from the traditional
desktops to mobile terminals, which leads to the exponential
increase in wireless data traffic [1], [2]. A recent report
released by Ericsson [3] indicates that mobile data traffic
will grow 10-fold between 2011 and 2016 (mainly driven
by video), and mobile broadband subscriptions having been
growing by 60 percent per year and are expected to grow from
900 million in 2011 to almost 5 billion in 2016. In parallel,
social medias, such as Facebook, Twitter, and Youtube have
significantly prompted users to continuously upload graphics
and video files to the servers, resulting in the fact that the
amount of uploaded data has exceeded the amount of downloaded data from time to time [4]. Thus, the management of
data traffic congestion and quality of service is a challenging
issue in the industry that must be resolved.
To address this issue, industries have started developing LTE-advanced networks and standardizing the 5G technology [5], [6]. Although encouraging progress has been
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made, these efforts are not only expensive but also have
limited contributions to mitigating the uploading traffic congestion, especially for the crowded spectrum in 5G cellular
networks. Mobile data offloading is proposed as an effective
means to deal with this problem. The basic idea of mobile
data offloading is to allow cellular data flows to be transmitted through complementary networks such as WiFi and
Femtocell. This process can take place anonymously and can
be fully and dynamically controlled by the service providers.
According to 3GPP Rel. 10 [7], data in LTE networks may be
transmitted simultaneously via LTE and the access points of
WiFi and Femtocell networks. Such a paradigm is termed IP
Flow Mobility (IFOM). The principle of IFOM is illustrated
in Fig. 1 where a user device is making a voice call through
the base station and uploading data via an access point at the
same time, provided that this user needs to complete these
two tasks simultaneously and is in the range covered by the
access point [5].
In addition to allowing heterogeneous data flows to be
transmitted via distinct technologies, IFOM permits the same
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FIGURE 1. An illustration of IFOM technology.

data flow to be split into two (sub-) data flows, and each of
which may be transmitted by different wireless networks [8].
Not only service providers and operators can benefit from
IFOM in data offloading, but the mobile devices can gain
much in terms of power consumption as well. Taking a
file transfer as an example, uploading a 10 KB file via an
LTE network will roughly consume twice as much energy
as uploading the same amount of data via a WiFi network
and this ratio would become 2.53 when file size is 10 MB.
On the other hand, by Nokia Siemens Networks and ABIs
documents, a user would be typically either stationary or in a
room when uploading a large volume of data [9]. Based on the
fact that over 80% of the mobile data are generated by users
in cities or dense areas [9], WiFi and/or Femtocell networks
can be set up to intentionally cover these areas. By doing so,
IFOM technology can effectively alleviate the burden of the
evolved Node B (eNodeB) and improve the quality of service
in hot-spot areas.
As IFOM has a great potential to accelerate the development of mobile Internet, it has attracted attentions from
both academia and industry during the past few years.
While tremendous studies on IFOM have been reported in
the research community, most of them, however, are concerned with IFOM technical issues only, little work regarding the IFOM application has been done from an economic
perspective. Given the fact that service providers and users
are the main players involved in the proliferation of the IFOM
technology, how they make their strategy in the case of support or not support IFOM and how the service providers share
the market and make profits through IFOM is left untouched.
Therefore, it is necessary and interesting to explore the IFOM
technology in order to answer the above questions.
Apparently, the number of access points is the key
contributing factor to the quality of service since a larger
number of access points will generally result in a better
quality of experience, provided that they are capable of
offloading traffic from eNodeB. In this regard, service
providers or network operators are facing a dilemma: if they
3056

plan to attract more customers to use their service, they probably are required to offer better services to their customers
by installing or renting more infrastructures (access points),
this, however, will incur extra costs and investments to the
company, and thus they would prefer to use the existing LTE
facilities to serve their users as much as possible for saving
dollars. On the other hand, if they rely on the existing LTE
facilities too much, they will suffer from the inferior quality
of service provisioning, and thus would be at risk of losing
customers. In addition, the service provider will compete with
its peers in the market for its own market share and revenue.
So what kind of market strategy and policy, if any, would
mostly facilitate the utilization of the IFOM technology and
deliver a win-win situation for all competitors? This remains
a question that must be answered in the study of the IFOM
technology.
In this work, we model the relationships among mobile
service providers and users, analyze their marketing strategies, and investigate the contributing factors that impact their
behaviors. The contributions of this paper are summarized as
follows.
• We investigate the relationships among mobile service
providers and users using category theory and game
theory. While the category theoretical model presents a
macroscopic perspective on such relationships, the game
theoretic model provides a microscopic view for the
specifics of the competition among service providers
and users. The modeling techniques deliver an essential framework for the marketing behaviors of service
providers and users to be studied and predicted accurately, which offers valuable guidance for mobile
service providers in terms of the application of the IFOM
technology.
• We formally prove the existence and the uniqueness of
the Nash equilibrium (NE) of the model, and, based
on these proofs, propose an iterative algorithm to compute the NE. The algorithm follows the standard Jacobi
iterative form for solving systems of linear equations,
iteratively updates the data transmission partition ratio
of a service provider, and terminates when the difference
of such ratios yielded by the last two consecutive iterations is less than a certain small threshold. Moreover, the
convergence of the proposed algorithm is explored.
• We conduct thorough numeric experiments to determine
the factors that will affect the market share and the profit
of service providers with IFOM technology. Several
useful insights regarding the strategies of both service
providers and users are derived. We believe that this
research study will shed light for service providers on
the promotion and application of the IFOM technology.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
briefly reviews the related work. Section III formally
establishes the mathematical model for relationships among
service providers and users. Section IV presents the NE
analysis and the computation of NE is given in Section V.
Section VI conducts numerical experiments to investigate
VOLUME 5, 2017
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various properties regarding the competition. At last,
section VII draws the conclusion of this paper.
II. RELATED WORK

Generally, there are evidences that data offloading is playing
an increasingly important role in current wireless communication systems. For example, as noted in [10] and [11],
WiFi transmissions account for 65% of the total wireless data
communications in the U.S. with an average of 55% of power
consumption being saved on mobile devices, which is of support for the statement/observation that WiFi data offloading
constitutes a substantial portion of wireless communications.
In fact, numerous studies on data offloading have been
conducted in the literature. In [12], data offloading in LET
networks through WiFi direct D2D technique and the corresponding experiments were investigated. Data offloading in
LET-Femtocell networks in terms of maximizing the number
of devices and traffic was studied in [13]. In [14], a lessexpensive and small-scale data offloading, which uses D2D
links and is expected to be both flexible and cost-saving,
was suggested by Ishii et al. based on their observation that
Femtocell-supported data offloading typically does not work
well for large-scale business networks. Al-Kanj et al. [15]
presented a somehow different data offloading scheme for
D2D ad hoc systems where data are classified into different
types first and then, according to their types, are transmitted
to different (intermediate) mobile devices which will further
send the received data to other mobile devices. An optimization technique of data offloading was proposed by
Kim et al. [16] which can be expected to effectively improve
the performance of data offloading. Another data offloading
optimization technique, which is based on the download
contents as well as the analysis and predication by using
Markov chains, was given by Malandrino et al. [17]. Yet, a
new data offloading mechanism which considers the cluster
structure of wireless devices was investigated in [18], and
a dynamic programming-supported algorithm for optimizing
delayed WiFi offloading was proposed in [19].
It is worth noting that there are some studies on data
offloading in the literature that are conducted from some
economic perspectives, rather than from technical telecommunication viewpoints. A game theory model was proposed
by Iosifidis et al. [20] to probe the economic interests between
mobile service providers and users in the environment of
WiFi or Femtocell data offloading. In [21], a two-stage
game was used to simulate the beneficial gains of consumers
and mobile network operators, and their study reveals that
the close relationship between the packages subscribed by
users and their prices may have significant economic impacts
on both consumers and service providers. Zhuo et al. [22]
presented an incentive framework for 3G data offloading
where mobile service providers and users mutually negotiate
based on the calculation of their own economic benefits that
can be obtained from data offloading. The service provider
may need to deal with each individual user with an individual and distinct strategy, and as the negotiation evolves,
VOLUME 5, 2017

an equilibrium of interests on both sides is expected to
reach by reversed auctions. Similar to what proposed in [22],
a three-party incentive framework was suggested in [23]
where users, mobile network service providers, and WiFi
operators all negotiate one another. In particular, mobile service providers will need to compete and bargain with WiFi
operators in terms of their own economic interests.
There is a common problem among those economic
perspective driven data offloading studies in the literature:
most of them assumed (explicitly or implicitly) that there
is one mobile network service provider in the market, and
all the research work has consequently been performed on
the basis of such a (limited) assumption. We, in this paper,
tackle the general and more realistic scenario of multiple
service providers in the market, present category-theoretical
and game-theoretical formulations to model the competitions
among multiple mobile service providers and users, investigate the ensuing Nash equilibrium, and conduct extensive
experiments to validate the proposed model. Note that this
paper is an extension of our previous work [24], and differs
from [24] in the sense that is possesses the following new
contents: a category theoretic model for formalizing the relationships among mobile service providers and users; a formal
proof for the convergence of the NE-computing algorithm;
and a set of numerical experiments showing the uniqueness
of the NE.
III. SYSTEM MODEL AND GAME FORMULATION

We consider the scenario where there are multiple service
providers (SPs) offering mobile Internet services to multiple users in the market. SPs rent or install some access
points (APs) within the covered areas of their base stations
for data offloading. In the following, we first give a category
theoretic formalization of the scenario, and then present a
game theoretic model for it. While the category theoretical
model offers an upper-level and yet mathematically clear
perspective on the relationships among SPs and users, the
game theoretic model handles the lower-level specifics and
technicalities of the competitions among them.
A. AN OLOG MODEL

Category theory [25] is a branch in mathematics that has
recently been recognized to have a wide range of applications
in sciences [26]. An Olog [26] diagram describing the relationships among users and service providers is given below.

In this diagram, the bottom rectangle represents an arbitrary user, and top two rectangles represent two arbitrary
3057
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service providers. An edge from the user to an SP signifies
that this user selects (or subscribes) this SP for his mobile
communication purposes; an edge from one SP to other signifies the fact that the former can be replaced by the latter in
terms of the services provided by them. For example, the top
edge from SP i to SP j means that the SP i (and its services)
can be completely replaced by SP j in the market of mobile
communications. The check mark in the triangle denotes that
this diagram is commutative. That is, the ‘‘combination’’ of
any two edges ‘‘in the same direction’’ is the same as another
edge that stars with the source of the first edge and ends with
the target of the second edge. For instance, the edge from user
k to SP i (labeled with ‘‘choose’’) followed by the edge from
SP i to SP j (labeled with ‘‘replaced by’’) is the same as the
edge from user k to SP j (labeled with ‘‘choose’’), which can
be practically interpreted as ‘‘when user k chooses SP i as
his service provider and SP i is replaced by SP j, then user k
chooses SP j as his service provider.’’
In fact, the set of all SPs and users in a mobile communication market, connected by the structure indicated in such a
diagram, forms a category. Formally,
Proposition 1: For a mobile communication market supported with the IFOM technology, we assume that any SP can
be replaced by any other SP in terms of services provided by
them (of course, an SP can be replaced by itself), any user can
potentially choose any SP as its mobile service provider, and
any user does not have any relationship with any other user
(except itself, of course). If we use X to denote the collection
of all SPs, all users, and all the relationships among SPs and
users in such a market, then X is a (mathematical) category.
Proof: We conduct the proof by checking the following
conditions (as required in the definition of a category).
• Objects. An object in X is either an SP or a user.
• Morphisms. A morphism in X is a relationship from
one object to another object (including the relationship
from an object to itself; see below). Since morphisms
are relationships, there is at most one morphism from an
object to another object. The domain of a morphism f,
dom(f ), is the source object of the relationship, and the
codomain of a morphism f, cod(f ), is the target object
of the relationship. We write f : A → B to signify that f
is a morphism with dom(f ) = A and cod(f ) = B.
• Composition of morphisms. The composition of two
morphisms f and g with dom(g) = cod(f ), g ◦ f , is
defined to the unique morphism from dom(f ) to cod(g).
• Identity morphisms. For any object A in X,
– If A is an SP object, then the identity morphism
of A, idA , is the ‘‘SP can be replaced by itself’’
relationship.
– If A is a user object, then the identity morphism of A,
idA , is simply the ‘‘the user is only related to itself’’
relationship.
• Identity law. For any object A in X, by the way in which
morphism composition is defined, we clearly have
idA ◦ f = f
3058

and g ◦ idA = g

•

for any morphism f with cod(f ) = A and any morphism
g with dom(g) = A.
Associativity law. For any three morphisms f : A →
B, g : B → C, h : C → D, again, by the definition of
the composition of morphisms, we can see that
h ◦ (g ◦ f ) = (h ◦ g) ◦ f .

The fact that X is a category follows immediate from the
above observations.
B. GAME FORMULATION

Game Theory is a powerful tool concerned with the analysis
of strategies for dealing with competitive situations where the
outcome of a participant’s choice of action depends critically
on the choice of actions of other participants. With some successful applications in wireless communications [27], [28],
Game Theory is leveraged here to characterize, specify, and
compute the relationship between SPs and users and that
among SPs themselves.

FIGURE 2. Data offloading service partition.

With IFOM support, data uploaded from users is split into
two parts: one is transmitted via the base station and the other
is transmitted through the APs. Assume that the amount of
data transmitted by APs or BS is decided by SP as suggested
in Fig. 2, for each total unit amount of data uploaded by users,
SP determines that λ(0 < λ < 1) amount of data transmitting
via access points and (1 − λ) amount of data transmitting via
BS. Note that the value of λ depends on the amount of APs,
a larger number of access points will generally result in a
wider coverage area and thus a larger λ.
We use p to denote the user’s cost for uploading a unit
amount of data. µLTE , µAP are used to denote the positive
outcome with the LTE network when uploading a unit of
amount of data and the positive outcome with the APs. The
values of µLTE and µAP can be the indicators of users’ quality
of experience with the related services. As APs generally
deliver a faster data transmission than LTE networks, we can
reasonably assume µAP > µLTE . Let UUE be the users’ utility
when uploading a unit amount of data. Thus, for SP i’s users,
we have
UUE (λi ) = µLTE · (1 − λi ) + µAP · λi − p,

(1)

where we assume that µLTE and µAP are in the same order of
magnitude with user’s cost p.
The above equation can also be written as
UUE (λi ) = µLTE + (µAP − µLTE ) · λi − p.

(2)

Note that the value of UUE reflects users’preference with
respect to choosing SP. To a given SP, the larger the value of
UUE , the more preferable it is.
VOLUME 5, 2017
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another, we can reasonably stipulate that δUE > δSP . In the
following section, we will choose an arbitrary SP as the objective to formulate its relationship with users as an infinitely
repeated game and investigate the theoretic properties of this
game.

IV. NASH EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS
A. EQUILIBRIUM BETWEEN SP AND USER

FIGURE 3. Correlations between SP’s utility and the user’s utility and λ.

Similarly, denote cLTE , cAP as the cost of transmitting a
unit amount of data via LTE network (BS) and through APs,
respectively. We assume that cAP > cLTE for the reason that
enabling data offloading will typically need to rent or set up
more APs by an SP. Let USP be the utility of SPs when a unit
amount of data is transmitted. For SP i, we have
USP (λi ) = p − cLTE · (1 − λi ) − cAP · λi ,

(3)

which can also be written as
USP (λi ) = p − cLTE − (cAP − cLTE ) · λi ,

(4)

where cAP − cLTE > 0.
The relationships between SP’s utility and λ as well as
between user’s utility and λ are illustratively depicted in
Fig. 3. As this figure shown, a larger λ results in a larger UUE ,
but a smaller USP . This indicates that the utility functions
are reasonably designed because a larger λ means more data
transmission over APs, which, respectively, means a higher
cost (thus low utility) for SPs and a higher benefit (utility) for
users. Therefore, users would prefer to a larger number of APs
so that their utility could be improved toward maximization.
On the other hand, SPs would prefer that data be transmitted
via the existing LTE network so that the cost for installing new
or renting more APs would be reduced, and the utility would
be increased. In other words, when an SP makes its strategies,
it requires to not only consider the competition between itself
and other peer SPs, but also seek a trade-off between the
maximization of its own utility and the maximization of the
user’s utility.
Discount factor is an important parameter in the Game
Theory. It roughly describes the patience of players in a game,
and is spanned from 0 to 1. In our game model, the discount
factor determines the competition capabilities of an SP, that
is, a larger discount factor would lead to a more patient of a
player.
Let δUE and δSP be the discount factor of users and SPs
respectively. Considering the profit depends on its services to
users and there are multiple SPs in the market competing one
VOLUME 5, 2017

It is practical to assume that a user does not tend to switch his
service provider in a short time span when there are multiple
SPs competing for the subscribers in the market. Within this
short time span, SP i adjusts the value of λi , 0 < λi < 1 in
order to satisfy the user’s need. So the relationship between
SP i and the user can be formulated under the framework of
infinitely repeated games, where users consume the service
and experience the service quality provided by the SP i, and
the SP i learns about user’s satisfaction degree by monitoring
the number of users subscribing to its service. Evidently, the
model is a repeated game with complete information.
At the initial stage of the game, SP i configures a service
partition λ1i to evaluate the user’s potential response (agree
or disagree) to this service partition, and then SP adjusts
the service partition in light of the potential response. For
i (λ1 ) is lower than the user’s
example, if the user’s utility UUE
i
i
0
expected utility UUE (λi ), ‘‘disagree’’ decision probably will
be made by the user and SP i will subsequently set another
i (λ2 ) ≥ U i (λ0 ).
service partition λ2i to the user such that UUE
i
UE i
The game repeats until an agreement on the service partition
value set by SP i is achieved.
It is known in Game Theory that if a player’s strategy
profile cannot yield any better utility with one deviation under
any possible circumstances, then this strategy would be the
subgame perfect strategy. For dynamic games with complete
information, a combination of subgame perfect Nash equilibrium must be the Nash equilibrium of the entire game.
Thus, we assume that the game reaches an equilibrium at the
t-th (t ≥ 1) round. As such, (λti ≥ λ0i , agree) would be
the equilibrium strategy profile for SP i and the user, such
i (λt ) ≥ U i (λ0 ) and U i (λt ) ≤ U i (λ0 ), where
that UUE
i
UE i
SP i
SP i
0
λi is the expected service partition of the user. Suppose SP
i deviates the equilibrium strategy at t-th round of the game
by setting λ̂ti < λ0i . Then in this case the user’s response
would be ‘‘disagree’’, and starting at the (t + 1)-th round,
the SP i’s strategy and the user’s strategy would come back
to (λt+1
≥ λ0i , agree).
i
As a larger service partition value would lead to a smaller
utility for SP i, λit+1 = λ0i would be the best choice for SP i.
Thus, there exists recurrent strategy profile in the infinitely
repeated game between SP i and the user. Based on Nash
recurrence theorem and one-deviation property, we propose
the following theorem.
Theorem 1: When there is only a single SP in the market
(i.e., n = 1), the infinitely repeated game between this SP i
and the user has no Nash equilibrium. That is, the following
3059
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B. THE COMPETITION AMONG SPS

recurrent strategy profile
{(λi = λ0i , agree), (λi < λ0i , disagree)}
is not a subgame P
perfect equilibrium.
i and P Û i be total utility of SP i
Proof: Let
USP
SP
when it does not and does deviate at the t-th round in the
game. When SP i deviates from λti to λ̂ti at the t-th round, we
i (λ̂t ) > U i (λt ) ≥ U i (λ0 ). At this
have λ̂ti < λ0i and USP
i
SP i
SP i
point, the user will take the strategy: disagree. Starting at the
(t + 1)-th round, the strategies of the SP i and the user will go
back to the equilibrium (λi = λ0i , agree). Note that the utility
i (λt+1 ) at the (t + 1)-th round can be regarded as
of SP USP
i
the utility at the t-th round multiplied by the discount factor,
that is,
i
i
USP
(λit+1 ) = δSP USP
(λ0i ).

Similarly,
i
2
i
0
USP
(λt+2
i ) = δSP USP (λi )

and
i
k
i
0
USP
(λt+k
i ) = δSP USP (λi )

for any natural number k. When SP i deviates the equilibrium
strategy at the t-th round in the game, the user’s response
would be ‘‘disagree". Thus, from the (t + 1)-th round, SP i
will keep the equilibrium strategy again. So
∞
X

i
ÛSP
=

t−1
X

i
i
i
USP
+ USP
(λ̂ti ) + δSP USP
(λ0i )

l=1

l=1

i
+δSP USP
(λ0i ) + · · ·

t−1
X

2

=

i
+USP
(λ̂ti ) +

δSP
U i (λ0 ).
1 − δSP SP i

i
USP

l=1

When SP i does not deviate, we have
∞
X
l=1

i
USP
=

t−1
X
l=1

t−1
X

i
USP

l=1

i
+USP
(λ0i ) +

δSP
U i (λ0 ).
1 − δSP SP i

i (λ̂t ) > U i (λ0 ), we see
Since USP
i
SP i

δSP
δSP
i
i
USP
(λ0i ) > USP
(λ0i ) +
U i (λ0 ).
1 − δSP
1 − δSP SP i
P i
P i
That is, ÛSP
> USP
. Hence, deviation strategy would be
preferred by SP i, since it can always produce a higher utility
for SP i.
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where each Ai (i = 1, . . . , n) represents the base market
share of SP i. bij (0 < bij ≤ 1, i, j = 1, . . . , n, i 6= j)
is the replacement coefficient which indicates the extent of
the possibility that SP i can be replaced by SP j. A larger
value of bij signifies a higher possibility that SP i can be
replaced by SP j. ai (0 < ai < 1, i = 1, . . . , n) is the
service coefficient of SP i, which represents how much of
SP i’s market share will be affected by the data services, a
larger value of ai indicates that SP i’s business depends more
on the data services it provides. Thus, the profits of these SPs
can be computed as shown in formula (8), as shown at the top
of the next page.
The profit maximization of these SPs can be formulated as

max [π1 (λ1 , λ2 , . . . , λn )]



0<λ1 <1


 max [π2 (λ1 , λ2 , . . . , λn )]
0<λ2 <1
(6)

...




 max [πn (λ1 , λ2 , . . . , λn )].
0<λn <1

i
i
i
USP
+ USP
(λti ) + δSP USP
(λ0i )

i
+δSP 2 USP
(λ0i ) + · · · =

i
USP
(λ̂ti ) +

When a user’s utility with his/her current SP i is lower than
the expected, this user may consider switching to another
SP j (j 6 = i). So there exists a competition among SPs
in the market, which will continue until an equilibrium is
reached. Considering that during the competition, each SP
will strive for its own maximal profit, we therefore model this
competition as a non-cooperative game.
Assume that λ1 , λ2 , . . ., λn are used to denote SPs’ network
service partition value, R1SP , R2SP , . . . , RnSP are used to denote
SPs’ market share, and π1 , π2 , . . . , πn are used to denote
SPs’ profit, respectively. Note that the service (or part of it)
provided by any SP i may be replaced by another SP j(i 6= j)
in the market, we have
 1
RSP = A1 + a1 λ1 − b12 λ2 − b13 λ3 − · · · − b1n λn



 2
RSP = A2 + a2 λ2 − b21 λ1 − b23 λ3 − · · · − b2n λn

 ...

 n
RSP = An +an λn − bn1 λ1 − bn2 λ2 − · · · − bn(n−1) λn−1 ,
(5)

Toward solving (6), we need

∂π (λ , λ , · · · , λn )

 1 1 2
=0



1
 ∂π (λ , ∂λ


2 1 λ2 , · · · , λn )

=0

∂λ2
...



∂πn (λ1 , λ2 , · · · , λn )



=0


∂λn


0 < λi < 1, i = 1, . . . , n,

(7)

and the solution to (7) would be the Nash equilibrium of
the competition of these SPs. Using (8), we can obtain the
bonding relationship of the service partition values of these
SPs via their best response functions, which are shown in
formula (9), as shown at the top of the next page.
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1
1

 π1 (λ1 , λ2 , · · · , λn ) = RSP USP = [A1 + a1 λ1 − b12 λ2 − b13 λ3 − · · · − b1n λn ][p − cLTE − (cAP − cLTE )λ1 ]

2
2 = [A + a λ − b λ − b λ − · · · − b λ ][p − c
π2 (λ1 , λ2 , · · · , λn ) = RSP USP
2
2 2
21 1
23 3
2n n
LTE − (cAP − cLTE )λ2 ]
·
·
·



n = [A + a λ − b λ − b λ − · · · − b
πn (λ1 , λ2 , · · · , λn ) = RnSP USP
n
n n
n1 1
n2 2
n(n−1) λn−1 ][p − cLTE − (cAP − cLTE )λn ]

p
−
c
b
λ
+
b
λ
+
·
· · b1n λn
A
LTE
12
2
13
3
1

 λ1 = f1 (λ2 , λ3 , · · · , λn ) = −
+
+


2a1
2(cAP − cLTE )
2a1



A2
p − cLTE
b21 λ1 + b23 λ3 + · · · b2n λn

λ2 = f2 (λ1 , λ3 , · · · , λn ) = −
+
+
2a2
2(cAP − cLTE )
2a2
 ···




A
p − cLTE
bn1 λ1 + bn2 λ2 + · · · bn(n−1) λn−1


 λn = fn (λ1 , λ2 , · · · , λn−1 ) = − n +
+
2an
2(cAP − cLTE )
2an


b12
b1n A1
p − cLTE
−1
···
−

2a1 2a1
2(cAP − cLTE ) 
 b 2a1
b2n A2
p − cLTE 
 21

−1 · · ·
−


2a2
2a2 2a2
2(cAP − cLTE ) 
Q0 = 
 .

..
..
..
..
 ..

.
.
.
.


 bn1
bn(n−1)
An
p − cLTE 
···
−1
−
2an
2an
2an
2(cAP − cLTE )

1 = (A + a λ − b λ )[p − c
π1 (λ1 , λ2 ) = R1SP USP
1
1 1
12 2
LTE − (cAP − cLTE )λ1 ]
2 = (A + a λ − b λ )[p − c
π2 (λ1 , λ2 ) = R2SP USP
2
2 2
21 1
LTE − (cAP − cLTE )λ2 ]

We now study the existence and uniqueness of the Nash
equilibrium for the model proposed in this paper. A prerequisite for the discussion here is the Glicksberg-Fan fixed point
theorem [29], [30], which states that in a finite game, if each
player’s strategy space is non-empty, compact, and convex,
and if each player’s payoff function is continuous and quasiconcave over its strategy space, then this game has a Nash
equilibrium.
Theorem 2: The game model proposed in Section IV-B has
a Nash equilibrium.
Proof: Let N be the set of players, λi be play i’s strategy,
and πi be player i’s payoff function. Then, the following facts
can be observed.
• Clearly, the number of mobile network service providers
in the market is limited. That is, the set N is finite.
• Note that the strategy space for any player i is (0, 1) since
λi ∈ (0, 1). Note also that (0, 1) is bounded; thus the
strategy space for any player is a non-empty, compact,
and convex Euclidean
set.
∂ 2 πi
• The fact that
=
−2a
i (cAP − cLTE ) < 0 indicates
∂λ2i
that πi is concave (and thus quasi-concave); moreover
πi is obviously continuous.
By the Glicksberg-Fan fixed point mentioned above, the existence of a Nash equilibrium for the proposed model follows
immediately.
Theorem
P 3: The Nash equilibrium in Theorem 2 is unique,
if ai > 12 nj6=i bij for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}.
Proof: Acoording to Cachon and Netessine [31], if
the response functions of players are contractive, then the
Nash equilibrium would be unique. Note that the response
functions of players in our game are given by formula (9),
so showing the contractiveness of these functions amounts to
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(8)

(9)

(10)

(11)

showing the following Hessian matrix
∂ 2 π1

 ∂λ21
 2
 ∂ π2

 ∂λ2 λ1

 ..
 .

 2
 ∂ πn
∂λn λ1


∂ 2 π1
∂λ1 λ2
∂ 2 π2
∂λ22
..
.
∂ 2 πn
∂λn λ2

...
...
..

.

...


∂ 2 π1
∂λ1 λn 


∂ 2 π2 

∂λ2 λn 


..

.


∂ 2 πn 
∂λ2n

is diagonally dominant [32], [33]. For this Hessian matrix to
be diagonally dominant, we need
 2
∂ π1
∂ 2 π1
∂ 2 π1


| + ··· + |
|
| 2 | > |


∂λ1 λ2
∂λ1 λn
∂λ1




∂ 2 π2
∂ 2 π2
 ∂ 2 π2
| 2 |>|
| + ··· + |
|
∂λ2 λ1
∂λ2 λn
∂λ2



···



∂ 2 πn
∂ 2 πn
 ∂ 2 πn

| + ··· + |
|.
| 2 | > |
∂λn λ1
∂λn λn−1
∂λn

(12)

Since
 2
∂ π1


| 2 | = | − 2a1 (cAP − cLTE )|



∂λ1




 ∂ 2 π2
| 2 | = | − 2a2 (cAP − cLTE )|
∂λ2



·
·
·



2π

∂

n

 | 2 | = | − 2an (cAP − cLTE )|,
∂λn
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and
 2
∂ 2 π1
∂ π1


|+
·
·
·
+|
| = |(b12 + · · · + b1n )(cAP −cLTE )|
|



∂λ1 λ2
∂λ1 λn


2
2

∂ π2
∂ π2


|
|+ · · · +|
| = |(b21 + · · · + b2n )(cAP −cLTE )|
∂λ2 λ1
∂λ2 λn
···




∂ 2 πn
∂ 2 πn



|
|+
·
·
·
+|
| = |(bn1 + · · · + bn(n−1) )


∂λn λn−1

 ∂λn λ1
(cAP − cLTE )|,
we see that if

b12 + · · · + b1n


a1 >


2



 a2 > b21 + · · · + b2n
2
..



.




 an > bn1 + · · · + bn(n−1) ,
2
then the inequalities in (12) would hold, which consequently
implies the contractiveness of the response functions and thus
the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium.
Note the coefficient matrix of formula (9) is


b12
b1n
−1
···

2a1
2a1 
b
b2n 
 21

−1
···



,
2a
2a
2
2
Q=
(13)

.
.
.
.
 ..
..
..
.. 


 bn1

bn(n−1)
···
−1
2an
2an
and its augmented coefficient matrix Q0 is displayed in (10),
as shown at the top of the previous page.
By the standard theorem regarding the solution existence
for non-homogeneous system of equations, we know that (7)
has a solution if

r(Q) = r(Q0 )
(14)
0 < λi < 1, i = 1, . . . , n
where r(Q) and r(Q0 ) are ranks of SPs’ coefficient matrix
Q and augmented coefficient matrix Q0 respectively. Hence,
the competing SPs in the market will reach an equilibrium if
equation (14) holds. Typically, if r(Q) 6 = r(Q0 ) at some point
during the course of the SPs’ competition, then the values of
r(Q) and r(Q0 ) will be eventually equal to each other as the
result of the continuous strategy adjustments performed by
the SPs and the elimination of some of them by the market.
V. NASH EQUILIBRIUM COMPUTATION
A. AN ITERATIVE ALGORITHM

Following the discussion of the existence and uniqueness of
the Nash equilibrium in the previous section, we now delve
into the issue of finding the Nash equilibrium. Note that
∂ 2 πi
= −2ai (cAP − cLTE ) < 0
∂λ2i
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Algorithm 1 Computation of the Nash Equilibrium
Input: Ai , ai , p, cLTE , cAP , bij , vi for all
i, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}
Output: λ∗i for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}.
0
1 Initialization λi ← vi , k ← 1, flagi = 1 for all i
2 while loop until flagi = 0 for all i do
3
for i = 1 to n do
4
if flagi = 1 then
n
P

bij λk−1
j
j=1,j6=i
p−cLTE
Ai
← − 2ai + 2(cAP −cLTE ) +
;
2ai
k−1
k
k
|λi − λi | <  or |λi | ≥ 1 then
λ∗i ← λki , flagi ← 0;

5

λki

6

if

7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14

end
else
λki ← λ∗i ;
end
end
k ←k +1
end

for each player i, which indicates that the profit function πi of
each SP is concave and thus can be maximized. As such, for
each SP i, its best response would be service partition value λ∗
that maximizes its profit. That is,
 ∗
λ1 = arg{ max [π1 (λ1 , λ∗2 , · · · , λ∗n )]}



0<λ1 <1

 ∗

 λ2 = arg{ max [π2 (λ∗1 , λ2 , · · · , λ∗n )]}
0<λ2 <1

..


.


 ∗

 λn = arg{ max [πn (λ∗1 , λ∗2 , · · · , λn )]}.
0<λn <1

By using the standard Jacobi iterative method for solving
systems of linear equations, these λ∗i can be computed by the
following steps.
1) Initialize each λi to a predefined value. That is, λ0i =
vi ∈ (0, 1).
2) Update each λi by formula (9) (λki is used to represent
the outcome of λi in its k-th computation).
3) If |λki − λk−1
| <  or λki > 1 (where  is a small prei
defined threshold), then the computation is terminated,
and . Otherwise, repeat the process for the (k + 1)-th
round.
4) For each i, λ∗i is the Nash-equilibrium λ-value of SP i.
The detailed Jacobi λ∗i computation algorithm is given in
Algorithm 1.
B. CONVERGENCE OF THE ALGORITHM

We now investigate the convergence issue of the algorithm
presented in the previous section. The following theorem
gives a sufficient condition for the algorithm to be convergent.
Theorem 4: The Nash
Pequilibrium computation algorithm
is convergent if ai > 12 nj6=i bij for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}.
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Proof: According to [34, p. 47], a sufficient condition
for the general multidimensional Jacobi iteration1
(k+1)

xi

(k)

(k)

= φi (x1 , x2 , . . . , xn(k) )

(where φi is any function that produces a new value based on
old values) to converge is
n
X
∂φi
< 1,
∂xj

for all i.

j=1

This condition, when applied to the system of linear equations
of the form
Ax = b
(where A = (aij ) is an n × n matrix, and both x and b are n × 1
column vectors) becomes
n
X
aij
< 1,
aii

for all i,

j6=i

or equivalently,
|aii | >

n
X

for all i,

|aij |,

(15)

FIGURE 4. Various correlations between SP 1’s strategy and its economic
1 . (b) Relationships among
gains. (a) Relationships among λ1 , a1 , and RSP
1 . (d) Relationships
λ1 , a1 , and π1 . (c) Relationships among λ1 , b1i , and RSP
among λ1 , b1i , and π1 .

j6=i

which simply means that the coefficient matrix A is diagonally dominant. By formula (9), we can see that the linear
system of equations that Algorithm 1 attempts to solve is

 
2a1
−b12 · · · −b1n
λ1
 −b21
  λ2 
2a
·
·
·
−b
2
2n

 
 ..
..
..   .. 
..
 .
.
.
.  . 
−bn1 −bn2 · · ·
2an
λn


a1 (p − cLTE )
 −A1 + cAP − cLTE 


a2 (p − cLTE ) 

 −A2 +


cAP − cLTE 
=
.
..


.





an (p − cLTE ) 
−An +
cAP − cLTE
Hence, condition (15) translates to
|2ai | >

n
X

| − bij |,

for all i,

j6=i

that is,
n

ai >

1X
bij ,
2

for all i.

j6=i

VI. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS

Extensive experiments have been conducted toward investigating the following issues: (1) How can SP’s strategic
decisions affect their market share and profit? (2) Does the
1 In [34], Jacobi iterative method is called (basic) Gauss iterative method.
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number of SPs in the market have any impact on their market
share and profit? (3) In what way can SPs’ strategies affect
the Nash equilibrium? We in this section demonstrate these
experimental results. The following parameter setting is used
for all experiments in this section. µLTE = 0.6, µAP = 0.9,
p = 1.5, cAP = 1.2, cLTE = 0.5. Note that the parameters
configured here are used for illustrations only, other configurations can be set for the experiments and the same insights
can be obtained. The experimental results are statistically collected by averaging 1000 runs, which do not heavily affected
by any stochastic factors.
A. CORRELATION BETWEEN SPs’ BUSINESS STRATEGY
AND THEIR ECONOMIC BENEFITS

The business strategy of any SP can be primarily reflected
by its network service partition value (λ-value), its service
coefficient, and its replacement coefficient. Without loss of
generality, we choose SP 1 and study the correlation between
its business strategy and its economic benefits.
With A1 = 0.25, b12 = · · · = b1n = 0.5 and λ2 + λ3 +
· · · + λn = 0.3, Fig. 4 depicts various such correlations for
SP 1. Specifically, Fig. 4(a) shows the correlation among the
service partition value λ1 , service coefficient a1 , and market
share R1SP ; Fig. 4(b) the service partition value λ1 , service
coefficient a1 , and profit π1 ; Fig. 4(c) the service partition
value λ1 , replacement coefficients b1i , and market share R1SP ;
and Fig. 4(d) the service partition value λ1 , replacement
coefficients b1i , and market share π1 . We can see clearly
from Fig. 4(a) and Fig. 4(b) that for a fixed service partition
value, a larger service coefficient would give rise to a larger
market share and profit. However, as the service partition
value increases, the market share would consistently increase
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FIGURE 5. Correlations between the number of SPs in the market and the
economic benefits of SP 1. (a) Relationships among λ1 , the number
1 . (b) Relationships among λ , the number of SPs, and π .
of SPs, and RSP
1
1

FIGURE 6. A modified redisplay of Fig. 5(b) with specified number of SPs.

but the profit would first increase and then fall. Fig. 4(c) and
Fig. 4(d) exhibit that a higher replacement coefficient would
lead to a lower market share and a lower profit as well, when
the service partition value is fixed. This result is expected as
a higher replacement coefficient means that SP 1 has a higher
chance of being replaced by other SPs in the market, and thus
has a higher risk of being eliminated from the market. Similar
to Fig. 4(a) and Fig. 4(b), Fig. 4(c) and Fig. 4(d) reveal that, as
the service partition value increases, the market share would
increase all the way up but the profit would increase to a
certain point and then start decreasing, which indicates the
fact that no SPs can achieve unlimited profits.
B. CORRELATIONS BETWEEN THE NUMBER OF SPs AND
THE ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF SP 1

For any SP i,
bi1 λ1 + · · · + bi(i−1) λi−1 + bi(i+1) λi+1 · · · + bin λn
collectively represent the impact that all other SPs on this SP.
In particular, if the replacement coefficients in the above
formula are all equal, then λ1 + · · · + λi−1 + λi+1 + · · · + λn
would equivalently represent the number of SPs in the market
that will have an economic impact on SP i. Again, without
loss of generality, we choose SP 1 and investigate how its
business benefits would be influenced by the number of SPs
in the market. Fig. 5(a) and Fig. 5(b), respectively, depict
the impact of the number of SPs in the market on SP 1’s
3064

FIGURE 7. The convergence of the λ-value of SPs. (a) Two SPs in the
market. (b) Three SPs in the market.

market share and profit with respect to its service partition
value λ1 . From these two figures, besides the fact that an
increased service partition value would cause an increased
market shared and an increased/decreased profit (which is
the same as shown in Fig. 4), we can see that an increased
number of SPs in the market would lower both the market
share and the profit of SP 1, when the service partition value
is fixed. This observation matches the real-world competition
situation in the market since more number of SPs would
intensify the mobile service competition among these SPs,
which would most likely render some losses to SP 1. Also,
note that Fig. 5(b) reveals that SP 1’s service partition must
be at least 0.13 in order to have a positive profit when the
number of SPs in the market is relatively large (λ2 +λ3 +· · ·+
λn = 0.7).
Fig. 6 is a modified redisplay of what is depicted in
Fig. 5(b) with clearly specified different number of SPs in the
market. Evidently, we see that SP 1 has to keep increasing its
service partition value if it would like to continue to make
the maximal profit when the number of SPs in the market
increases.
C. NASH EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS

We now delve into the issue of Nash equilibrium.
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TABLE 1. Parameter settings for Figs. 7 and 8.

FIGURE 10. The change of the NE point with respect to the variation
of a1 , a2 .

FIGURE 8. The stabilization of the profit of SPs. (a) Two SPs in the market.
(b) Three SPs in the market.

FIGURE 9. The change of the NE point with respect to the variation
of A1 , A2 .

Using the data shown
P in Table 1 (note that the sufficient
condition ai > 12 nj6=i bij in Theorems 3 and 4 is satisfied by the data in this table), the uniqueness of the Nash
VOLUME 5, 2017

FIGURE 11. The change of the NE point with respect to the variation
of b12 , b21 .

equilibrium (or the convergence of the Nash equilibrium
computing algorithm) is demonstrated in Fig. 7, where the
two subfigures 7(a) and 7(b) reveal the the cases when there
are two and three SPs in the market, respectively. Clearly,
the values of λi converge to a certain number after a certain
amount of iterations, as expected. Similar results, with respect
to the profit of SPs rather than their λ-values, are shown in
Fig. 8. Again, as expected, the profits of SPs all stabilize at
some value after a number of iterations, indicating that an
equilibrium state of profits among the SPs has been reached
after a number of competitions in the market.
Note that for any player SP i, its NE service partition
value λ∗i primarily depends on its base profit Ai , its service
coefficient ai , its replacement coefficients bij , and the NE
service partition values λ∗j of other players (SPs). As such,
we investigate how the NE point can be affected by these
parameters in the rest of this section. For sake of illustrative
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TABLE 2. Parameter settings for Figs. 9, 10, and 11.

and a1 , a2 (in Fig. 10) increase, respectively; and increases
as the values of b12 , b21 (in Fig. 11) increase. Analogously,
Fig. 12 provides the same observation for the case where there
are three players (SPs) in the market.
VII. CONCLUSION

FIGURE 12. The change of the NE point with respect to the variation
of bij .

convenience, we study and demonstrate the case when there
are two players SP 1 and SP 2; the general case of multiple players (n > 2) can be analyzed in a similar manner.
By replacing n with 2 in equation (9), we have

A1
p − cLTE
b12 λ2

 λ1 = f (λ2 ) = −
+
+
2a1
2(cAP − cLTE )
2a1
A
p − cLTE
b21 λ1

 λ2 = f (λ1 ) = − 2 +
+
.
2a2
2(cAP − cLTE )
2a2
Figs. 9, 10, and 11 (in which lines are color-wise paired
and the NE point (λ∗1 , λ∗2 ) is the intersection of two samecolored lines) illustrate how the NE point (λ∗1 , λ∗2 ) changes
depending on the variation of one of the three parameters
(base profit, the service coefficient, replacement coefficient)
with the other two being fixed. The settings of these parameters are summarized in Table 2. Evidently, we observe that the
NE point (λ∗1 , λ∗2 ) decreases as the values of A1 , A2 (in Fig. 9)
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In this paper, we have investigated the relationship between
IFOM-supported service provider and user and that among
multiple SPs in the mobile communications market. We have
formulated those relationships using category theory and
game theory. Through the latter one, the competition of
SPs are characterized. We have performed the Nash equilibrium (NE) analysis and proposed an iterative algorithm
for computing NE. Also, we have examined the correlations between the set of parameters, such as base profits,
service coefficients, and replacement coefficients and the set
of parameters market shares, profits, and Nash equilibrium.
We have found that:
1) SPs with a smaller replacement coefficient have a margin of superiority in the competition. Thus, an SP would
consider increasing its service variety and building its
business’s uniqueness if it is interested in maintaining
a strong competitive edge in the market.
2) For an SP, a larger service coefficient indicates a tighter
correlation between its service partition value and its
market share or profit.
3) An SP’s profit increases up to a certain point as its
service partition value increases. After that point, the
profit would decrease as the service partition value
increases. As such, SPs need to make reasonable adjustments to their strategies based on the fluid situation in
the market.
4) The NE value of the market increases when the SPs’
base profits and service coefficients decrease, and their
replacement coefficients increase. This suggests that an
SP should focus on improving its service coefficient
and base profit, considering that the data-uploading
service is typically offered by many SPs and thereby
results in a relatively high replacement coefficient.
As our future work, we plan to deepen our current study by
investigating the relationships between mobile network operators and complementary network service providers, within
the framework of Game Theory .
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